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Since 2013, inflation in the euro area has been too low. In order to revive the economy 
and bring inflation back to target, the European Central Bank has implemented a low 
interest-rate policy which includes a bond-buying programme known as quantitative 
easing or QE. The ECB’s measures, including historically ultra-low interest rates, also 
bear risks. For example, some observers fear the formation of a bubble in real estate 
and stock markets or complain about one-sided capital gains for wealthy households.
Low interest  
rates: Is the ECB’s  
policy correct?
“The ECB needs to have a policy that is suitable for 
Europe as a whole. It is too loose for Germany. 
When ECB President Mario Draghi embarked on 
the expansive monetary policy, I told him he 
would drive up Germany’s export surplus.”
Wolfgang Schäuble, German Federal Minister of Finance  
in an interview with Der Tagesspiegel on 4 February 2016
When are low interest  
rates problematic?
Price stability 
Price stability is enshrined 
in the European Treaties as 
a mandate of the European 
Central Bank. The ECB 
defines price stability as an 
annual interest rate of close 
to but below two percent. 
This level is considered desir- 
able because it provides 
a safety buffer against 
deflation without eroding 
savings too quickly. 
Deflation 
This means falling prices. 
When consumers expect  
a product to become 
cheaper in the future, they 
delay buying it. This leads  
to a slump in demand.  
A dangerous cycle emerges 
that the central bank is 
powerless to prevent.
In times of crisis, central banks 
lower interest rates so as to boost 
economic activity. Credit gets cheaper 
and investments should be boosted 
in turn. The jobs that thereby are 
created should help increase wages 
and, in the medium term, prices as 
well. During the euro crisis, however, 
this mechanism broke down. The euro- 
area economy recovered only slug- 
gishly and inflation remained stuck at 
zero percent, significantly below the 
 price stability target of just under 
two percent for a long time.
Zero percent inflation is dangerous 
for the economy. For consumers, 
there is less incentive to spend money 
today. Potential purchases are put on 
hold, because their money will still be 
worth just as much tomorrow. In this 
situation, the entire economy could 
come to a standstill and  deflation 
sets in. 
With low interest rates the ECB 
intends to bring inflation back to 
target. This involves risks: cheaper 
loans could lead to households and 
companies getting into excessive debt. 
With little or no interest on savings, 
providing privately for retirement 
becomes difficult. Banks earn less and 
less from their traditional lending 
business and go on to take increas- 
ingly large risks. 
The economic situation in the euro 
area varies greatly from one country 
to another. Therefore, countries have 
different preferences with regard to 
monetary policy. In Germany, the 
economy is growing and inflation  
is already close to its target, so the dis- 
 advantages of the current monetary 
policy attract plenty of (negative) 
attention. Italy, however, is battling 
high debt and unemployment. There 
the risks linked to an interest rate 
hike are felt particularly strongly. 
However, the ECB can only imple-
ment policies for the Eurozone as a 
whole, that is for a fictitious average 
country (“one-size-fits-all”).
“The impulse cannot come from the ECB alone. [It] 
does as much as it can, it does what it has to do […], 
but if the states and Europe do not shoulder their 
responsibility as well, growth cannot rise again.”
François Hollande, President of the Republic of France
at EuropaNova in Paris on 15 October 2016
“Germany is a country that has always called for the 
European Central Bank to pursue an independent 
policy […]. Because of that we will not influence the 
behaviour of the ECB. And as a result, I cannot and  
do not want to change the situation as it is.”
Angela Merkel, German Chancellor
on a state visit to Sweden on 31 January 2017
“Over the medium-term, it is unambiguous 
that monetary policy [of the ECB] has positive 
distributional effects through macroeconomic 
channels. Most importantly, it reduces unem-
ployment, which benefits poorer households  
the most.”
Mario Draghi, ECB President
in Berlin on 25 October 2016
Base interest rate 
A central bank uses the 
base rate to determine  
the price of money. In  
the short term, banks  
can borrow money from  
the central bank at this  
rate. This impacts all  
other in terest rates in  
the economy.
Quantitative easing (QE) 
In a QE programme,  
a central bank buys debt 
instruments – bonds 
from governments and 
companies for example –  
on a large scale. As it does 
not usually buy these 
securities from the debtors 
themselves but from their 
creditors (usually banks), 
this puts extra money into 
the financial system.
What is the ECB doing 
to increase inflation?
In 2013 and 2014, deflation in the 
euro area became a serious threat. 
In December 2014, the inflation rate 
fell below zero percent for the first 
time. At that point, the  base interest 
rate was already at zero percent. Like 
all major central banks, the ECB re-
sorted to non-conventional mon etary 
policy measures. The key one is the 
asset purchase programme, usually re- 
ferred to as  quantitative easing or QE. 
As part of its QE program, the ECB  
has been buying bonds worth 60 bil­
lion euro (temporarily even as much 
as 80 billion euro) each month since 
March 2015. The programme is set  
to continue at least until September 
2018, although at a reduced pace of 
30 billion euro from January 2018 
onwards. To put this figure in per-
spective, the German defence budget 
for 2017 is around 37 billion euro. By 
purchasing these bonds, the ECB is 
creating enormous demand for debt 
instruments across the board. This 
makes it attractive for banks to issue 
more loans on more favourable terms 
to companies and households. The 
investments financed via such lending 
create both growth and inflation. 
There are initial signs that the QE  
programme is proving effective:  
Loans for companies and households 
have become cheaper and unemploy- 
ment in the euro area has fallen. 
However, the inflation rate remained 
stubbornly low heading into the winter 
of 2016. Furthermore, growth rates 
varied greatly from one country to 
another. 
There are several reasons for the 
limited success of the ECB policy: 
In many Eurozone countries, banks 
and companies are still struggling 
to reduce the debt and bad loans 
that accumulated before and during 
the financial crisis. At the same time, 
moderate long-term growth pros-
pects are preventing companies from 
making adequate investments. What’s 
more, the European Single Market 
is not sufficiently integrated for a 
proper currency union. For example, 
large parts of the services sector 
remain largely protected from cross-
border competition.
A look 
ahead
 SCENARIO 1 
What is the ECB counting on?
The ECB hopes that inflation will soon revert to target, so it can then 
wind down the QE programme. In this process, it wants to avoid en-
dan gering the recovery by exiting the QE programme too early. Should 
exit lead to a relapse into low inflation, private sector confidence could 
also be undermined. And that trust is required for the recovery on the 
labour market to continue.
In light of an improving economic environment, falling unemployment  
and stronger growth across the euro area, the ECB reduced the volume 
of QE in April 2017 and announced to further cut monthly purchases 
to 30 billion euro in January 2018. Yet, against the backdrop of still too 
low inflation, the central bank has opted against a full wind down of 
QE, also known as tapering, and leaves its end-date open for now.
This course is contentious as some observers are concerned with the 
growing side-effects. As monetary policy takes time to feed through 
and inflation has already recovered somewhat, they fear the ECB 
could miss the right point in time for an exit.
It is unlikely that interest rates will rise again immediately after QE 
has stopped. The ECB has communicated clearly that it will keep key 
interest rates at their current levels well beyond the end of asset 
purchases. 
 SCENARIO 2 
What is the worst-case scenario?
If the situation in countries such as Italy or Greece deteriorates again,  
the danger of deflation could return quickly. The central bank retains 
the option of extending the QE programme once again if there is  
another economic downturn in the euro area.
However, experts dispute the extent to which any further intensi- 
fication of special measures would help revive the economy. The US 
example shows that the first use of a QE programme is usually the 
most effective. Moreover, the market for secure bonds that the ECB 
can purchase is limited. A shortage on these markets could endanger 
the programme.
Two side-effects of the QE programme are particularly risky: 
First, the ECB is actively intervening in the distribution of wealth. 
The owners of real estate or equities benefit particularly from low 
interest rates as increased investment drives up the value of these 
assets. Exacerbating wealth inequality undermines trust in the ECB. 
Secondly, the increased demand for riskier financial instruments 
such as shares or company bonds and rising real estate prices may 
result in new price bubbles. A subsequent market correction could 
cause another economic downturn.
 SCENARIO 3 
What can governments do?
Leaving the burden to deal with the euro-area debt crisis on the 
ECB alone is very risky. For the central bank to return to conventional 
monetary policy and raise interest rates again the euro area needs 
above all lasting growth. Inflation will in turn rise as a by-product. 
National governments can help by providing stimulus and invest- 
ment programmes, thereby speeding up the recovery. In particular, 
countries with healthy government finances such as Germany have 
room for manoeuvre here. 
Economic reforms can increase the euro area’s growth potential 
and thus ease the pressure on monetary policy. The elimination 
of regulatory barriers in the Single Market would allow European 
companies to grow faster. This could help to create new business 
models, especially in poorly integrated sectors such as digital or 
energy. 
Unlike the ECB, governments can deal with economic weaknesses 
in a targeted way. At the same time, the countries with the largest 
problems have the smallest financial leeway. A policy mix of mon-
etary policy, fiscal policy and structural reforms is difficult to 
coordinate, but is more effective in fostering growth and price 
stability than if the ECB carries the entire burden.
“The ECB’s policy was decisive in tackling the euro-area crisis. As economic 
conditions improve, it must decide what it believes is more important: price 
stability or economic stimulus for crisis countries. When inflation returns to 
target, the ECB should focus on its mandate and abandon the crisis mode. 
The member states have the responsibility to reform themselves.”
Philipp Ständer
The author is a Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin.
 LOW INTEREST  
RATES 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
0 
-1 
60 
40 
20 
0 
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
10 000
0
Progress of the ECB QE program: 
Monthly purchasing volume and  
asset stock# 1
FACT 
Household debt levels
Development of inflation in the euro 
area and adjustment of the base interest 
rate by the ECB # 2
FACT 
# 3
FACT 
80
60
40
20 
0 
2006 201420102007 201520112008 201620122009 20172013
The euro crisis 
starts and esca- 
lates increasingly 
until 2012.
The euro area is 
in recession, while 
inflation falls. The 
ECB reacts with 
interest rate cuts.
Due to the ongoing 
danger of deflation, 
the ECB begins the 
QE programme.
US real estate crisis 
spreads to the global 
financial markets. 
ECB drastically 
lowers the base 
interest rate.
The base rate is 
almost at 0%.
The figure shows the development of inflation in the euro area since 2006 and how the ECB  
adjusted the base rate accordingly. Apart from a brief exception in 2011, the ECB has repeat- 
edly reduced interest rates since 2008 to prevent a drop in inflation. Nonetheless, the inflation 
rate has consistently fallen since 2012 and only rose again in December 2016.
Source: ECB, Eurostat.
Those that benefit from the low interest rates include households that want to take on debt, for 
example to purchase a property. In the euro area, that applies to two out of five households on 
average. In 2014, 84 000 households in the euro area were surveyed on this issue.
Source: ECB.
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Announcement of 
the QE program
From March 2015. 
Monthly purchas ing 
volume of 60 bn €, 
to run until at least 
September 2016.
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2nd extension
From April 2017. Lowering 
of the volume to 60 bn € and 
extension until at least the 
end of 2017.
ECB balance sheet
After more than 
3 years of QE, 
the ECB will hold 
about 2.5 trillion € 
in assets.
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
1st extension
From April 2016.  
Increase of the volume 
to 80 bn € and extension 
until at least March 2017.
The figure shows the progress of the ECB’s QE programme since it was announced in  
January 2015. The flags mark the different points in time at which the ECB announced  
changes to its programme.
Source: ECB, author’s calculations.
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3rd extension 
From January 2018. 
Lowering of the vol - 
ume to 30 bn € and 
extension until at least 
September 2018.
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